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The period from 2000 to 2006 of the Lord's Resistance Army insurgency in northern Uganda begins with the assault of the Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF) upon LRA strongholds in South Sudan. This in turn led to a series of retaliatory attacks by the Lord's Resistance Army of an intensity not seen to since the mid-1990s. International awareness of the conflict gradually grew and in September 2005, the International Criminal Court issues warrants for the arrest of senior LRA commanders, including Joseph Kony. == Operation Iron Fist == In March 2002, the UPDF launched a massive military offensive, named "Operation Iron Fist", against the LRA bases in southern Sudan. The National Islamic Front government agreed to the entry of the Ugandan military into its borders, albeit below the so-called "red line" consisting of the Juba-Torit highway. This was part of its efforts to broadcast its new status as an engaged member of the international community. This agreement, coupled with the return of Ugandan forces that had been deployed in the Democratic Republic of Congo upon the official end of the Second Congo War, created what the Ugandan government felt was an ideal situation in which to end a conflict that had become both an embarrassment and political liability.〔(UGANDA-SUDAN: No rapid solutions in anti-LRA campaign ), IRIN PlusNews, 27 May 2002〕 This attempt at a heroic finish to the conflict failed in a spectacular manner. After several months of uncertainty, LRA forces began crossing back into Uganda and carrying out attacks on a scale and of a brutality not seen since 1995 to 1996. The LRA then began to move into areas outside of Acholiland, apparently in search of support. However, when the local populace began to resist, the LRA extended its combat operations. This resulted in widespread displacement and suffering in regions that had never previously been touched by the insurgency.〔(Behind the Violence: Causes, Consequences and the Search for Solutions to the War in Northern Uganda ) (PDF), (Refugee Law Project ) of Makerere University, Uganda, February 2004, p. 32.〕 One of the initial counterattacks was against Achol-pi Refugee Settlement on August 5, 2002. Twenty Sudanese refugees were killed in the second major attack on the Achol-pi Refugee Settlement in central Pader District. The 24,000 Sudanese refugees were transferred to safer locations and the settlement disbanded. Part of the failure of Operation Iron Fist is due to the large stockpile of supplies that the LRA had accumulated during the period that it was supported by the Sudanese government. However, the government also failed to destroy all of the LRA positions in Sudan, resulting in a fluid low-intensity conflict affecting a significant area of both southern Sudan and northern Uganda. There have also been reports that at least some elements in the Sudanese government are continuing to provide supplies to the LRA. This would negate predictions of its imminent destruction which are predicated on its supposed isolation. The former head of the UPDF, Maj. Gen. James Kazini, estimated LRA strength at 1,500 in May 2002. UPDF spokesman Maj. Shaban Bantariza put the figure at 900 fighters in mid-2003. These numbers are not necessarily contradictory if the first number includes noncombatants such as abducted "wives" and children too young to handle weapons. However, Human Rights Watch in a July 2003 report put the figure at 4,500. The International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) in its 2002 to 2003 report said LRA has 1,500 fighters. IISS added, however, that only 200 of the LRA troops are inside Uganda, the rest are in Sudan.〔(Uganda (LRA) ), Armed Conflict Database〕 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Lord's Resistance Army insurgency (2002–05)」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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